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Abstract 
How do communications and decisions impact the safety of sociotechnical systems? This paper 
frames this question in the context of a dynamic system of nested sub-systems. Communications 
are related to the construct of observability (i.e., how components integrate information to assess 
the state with respect to local and global constraints).  Decisions are related to the construct of 
controllability (i.e., how component sub-systems act to meet local and global safety goals). The 
safety dynamics of sociotechnical systems are evaluated as a function of the coupling between 
observability and controllability across multiple closed-loop components. Two very different 
domains (nuclear power and the limited service food industry) provide examples to illustrate 
how this framework might be applied. While the dynamical systems framework does not offer 
simple prescriptions for achieving safety, it does provide guides for exploring specific systems to 
consider the potential fit between organisational structures and work demands, and for 
generalizing across different systems regarding how safety can be managed.    
 
Practitioner Summary 
While offering no simple prescriptions about how to achieve safety in sociotechnical systems, 
this paper develops a theoretical framework based in dynamical systems theory as a practical 
guide for generalizing from basic research to work domains and for generalizing across 
alternative work domains to better understand how patterns of communication and decision 
making impact system safety. 
 
Keywords:  safety, sociotechnical systems, communications, decision making, observability, 
controllability, dynamical systems 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The objective for this paper is to explore how communications and decisions impact the safety of 
complex sociotechnical systems. In order to ground these explorations, we will focus on two case 
studies involving safety issues in two very different sociotechnical systems – the Millstone 
Nuclear Power Station and the fast (limited service) food industry. These two choices reflect two 
qualitatively different aspects of the safety problem. The Millstone case illustrates issues 
associated with process control, where the focus is on managing a complex, high-risk technology 
(i.e., a nuclear power plant). In contrast, the fast food industry case illustrates issues associated 
with occupational safety, where the focus is on managing the safety of individuals in the 
workplace (i.e., minimizing accidents associated with slips and falls). By choosing two very 
distinct safety challenges, we hope to highlight both: A) common challenges that must be 
addressed in the study of all sociotechnical systems, and B) important general properties of 
sociotechnical systems relevant to communicating and deciding. In particular, we will frame the 
problems of communicating and deciding relative to the dynamics of observing and controlling 
within a dynamic self-organizing system. It is our hope that this framing of the problem will lead 
to more productive collaborations between researchers and practitioners and to greater 
convergence across the many disciplines that can offer potential insights into this complex 
problem of safety. For alternative general discussions of a control theoretic framework in relation 
to modeling the performance of human-machine systems, consider the following sources: Flach 
et al. 2011, Flach et al. In press, Jagacinski and Flach 2005, Leveson 2012, Sheridan and Ferrell 
1974). 
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2. What is a sociotechnical system? 
 
A significant challenge that researchers interested in safety in sociotechnical systems must face 
is to identify the ‘system’ to be studied. Over the last 50 years, there is an important message that 
emerges from research on human cognition and organisational sensemaking – Context Matters! 
Simon (1969) illustrated this with his famous analogy of the ant on the beach, where he 
suggested that it would be impossible to model the ant’s behavior without including properties of 
the beach in the model.  In other words, the message is that cognitive systems are adaptive 
systems and, in order to understand the adaptive dynamics, it is important to include the 
‘situations’ that the cognitive agents/organisations are adapting to as part of the ‘system’ being 
modeled. This insight has been emphasized by constructs such as ‘situated cognition’ (e.g., 
Suchman 1987, Hutchins 1995) and ‘ecological rationality’ (e.g., Todd and Gigerenzer 2012). 
Thus, a core principal of a sociotechnical systems approach is that the system of interest must 
include both the ‘social’ and ‘technical’ aspects of work as interdependent components of the 
work system (e.g., Clegg 2000). 
In the specific context of system safety, Rasmussen et al. (1994) and Leveson (2012) 
emphasize the tight coupling between the technical system (e.g., a power plant or a fast food 
chain) and the larger social context (e.g., regulatory, political, and cultural ecologies). For 
example, Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) argue that due to the fast pace of technological change, 
the scale of industrial installations, and the high degree of integration and coupling across 
systems, it is ‘becoming increasing difficult to model work organisations in isolation and to 
make small-scale, local experiments to evaluate models’ (p. 10). Figure 1 (adapted from 
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Rasmussen and Svedung) illustrates some of the ways that technical systems have become 
coupled to the larger social context. Figure 1 illustrates the multiple dimensions of the work 
organisation, the broad range of environmental stressors that shape the demands and 
opportunities, and the diverse range of disciplines that provide theoretical and empirical bases for 
addressing different properties of the sociotechnical system. Leveson (2012; p. 82, Figure 4.4.) 
provides an alternative, more detailed illustration of the couplings across multiple levels 
associated with the design and operation of a complex sociotechnical system. However, we will 
use the Rasmussen and Svedung model as a general framework for mapping out the details 
associated with our two cases.  
-- Place Figure 1 about here -- 
 
2.1.  Millstone 
 
Figure 2 represents some key events relative to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station’s struggles 
to manage safety (Carroll & Hatkenaka 2001)1. The story of Millstone begins in the 1980s when 
a confluence of events set the stage for the emergence of serious safety concerns. These events 
included significant construction costs associated with the Unit 3 Reactor, the retirement of 
Millstone’s pioneering CEO, and a change in the economic climate due to potential deregulation 
of energy production. The result was increased pressure to reduce costs in response to the 
economic context illustrated as Block 1 in Figure 2. This increased economic pressure sent a 
ripple through the entire system that was felt at all levels. The ripples of these economic 
pressures were felt most acutely at the operational staff level where workers felt pressured to 
work closer to the safety margins and to delay enhancements that other plants in the industry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  All	  quotations	  pertaining	  to	  the	  Millstone	  case	  are	  taken	  from	  this	  article.	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were implementing. The result, represented by Block 2, was an impact on worker morale (e.g., 
dissatisfaction with management), on the performance of work (e.g., increasing backlogs in 
maintenance), and growing complaints to management, to regulatory agencies, and to the public. 
For example, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was ‘receiving approximately 50 
employee allegations annually’ (p. 71).  
Worker concerns about safety at Millstone eventually came to the attention of the broader 
public, and Time magazine began preparing a story about the ‘alleged harassment and 
intimidation of Millstone employees who raised safety concerns’ (p. 71) [Block 3]. Knowledge 
that Time magazine was working on this story helped to stimulate the NRC to become more 
actively involved with the Millstone situation at the start of 1996. In January, Millstone was 
placed on the Watch List and, when each of the three reactors was shut down for refueling and 
various equipment problems [Block 4], ‘the NRC ordered all three to demonstrate compliance 
with their licenses, regulations and safety analyses before restarting’ (p. 71) [Block 5]. In 
October, as the result of an NRC review, Northeast Nuclear Energy was directed to develop and 
implement a plan that would result in a “‘safety-conscious work environment’ in which 
employees could raise concerns without fear of retaliation – and management would take 
appropriate action” (p. 71). Additionally, the NRC told Northeast Utilities to contract with an 
independent third party (subject to NRC approval) to oversee the development and 
implementation of the plan for addressing safety concerns. 
-- Place Figure 2 about here -- 
In response to pressures from the NRC and its own internal assessment of the 
management problems at Millstone, Northeast Utilities hired a new leader, Bruce Kenyon, to 
oversee the nuclear programs [Block 6]. Kenyon immediately began a dialog with the working 
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staff both to learn more about the problems and also to demonstrate his commitment to ‘do what 
was right’ (p. 72) [Blocks 7, 8, 10 and 11]. Block 7 represents the first step in establishing this 
dialog, which involved a two-week assessment period including peer ratings of the management 
staff that reported to him, and concluded with the firing of two vice presidents and demotion of a 
third.  Several months later, disciplinary actions taken against the manager of the oversight 
department for issues that had been around for many years had the unintended consequence that, 
in the context of the earlier work experiences [Block 2], was perceived by many employees as an 
attack on independent oversight [Block 8]. Thus, Blocks 7 and 8 represent the initiation of a 
continuing closed-loop dialogue between workers and management. By ‘closed-loop’ we mean 
that communications from senders are two-way: information, commands, requests, and actions 
are interpreted by the audience which sends signals back to the senders in the form of more 
communications (including actions that speak louder than words, if anyone listens).  Some 
additional key events in that dialog included hiring a Navy admiral as the new vice president of 
oversight, who in turn hired his former chief of staff ‘to strengthen and run the employees 
concerns program’ (p. 72) [Block 10]. Another important event was the establishment of a 
program to train line management to work and communicate more effectively with employees to 
establish a safety conscious work environment [Block 11]. Also, the hiring of an independent, 
external oversight team [Block 9] played an important role in helping management to better 
understand the safety problems and in facilitating communications between workers and 
management.  
 It is impossible to represent the complete time history associated with the dialog between 
management and staff [e.g., Blocks 7, 8, 10 and 11] without making Figure 2 too complex to be 
useful. The progress toward improved safety did not follow a simple, smooth, errorless path. It 
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took time to rebuild the trust that had eroded between workers and management – well intended 
actions had unintended negative consequences (e.g., as a result of how they were perceived by 
workers) and some actions were simply wrong and required correction (e.g., two contractors who 
were fired after raising safety concerns were offered their jobs back). Thus, we have highlighted 
this as a closed-loop subsystem. The closed-loop dynamics of the dialog between management 
and workers at Millstone will be examined in more detail in the context of the dynamics of 
communicating and deciding. The closed-loop nature of this dynamic has important implications 
for how we frame research on communications and decisions in sociotechnical systems. 
 
2.2.  Limited service food industry 
  
 Figure 3 provides a map of the sociotechnical landscape for some important events associated 
with slips and related injuries in the limited service or fast food industry (Verma et al. 2010, 
2011)2. The focus of this story starts with Block 3, which represents slips in limited service 
restaurants. Slips and falls are the leading cause of injury in fast food restaurants. In the US, they 
account for one third of the disabling injuries. It has been estimated that the rate of falls over a 
two-year period is about 4.1 per 100 full-time-equivalent restaurant employees (Leamon & 
Murphy 1995).  Other studies suggest that upwards of 60% of these falls can be attributed to 
slipping. In addition to falls, slips are also implicated in other accidents such as grease burns 
(Hayes-Lundy et al. 1991). Direct costs of slips, trips, and fall related injuries in the US in 2010 
were estimated to be $8.61 billion, according to the Liberty Mutual Workplace Safety Index. 
(2012). This is a 37% increase from 1998, which is the greatest increase among major leading 
causes of workplace injury. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  All	  information	  relative	  to	  slips	  in	  the	  limited	  food	  service	  injuries	  are	  taken	  from	  these	  sources.	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-- Place Figure 3 about here -- 
An important factor associated with slipping is the coefficient of friction (COF) for floors. 
For example, Verma et al. (2010) found that the rate of slipping decreased by 21% for each 0.1 
increase in COF [Block 4]. However, the COF for surfaces will also be determined by whether 
they are clean. Many fast food franchises require that enzymatic floor cleaners be utilized in all 
their stores [Block 5]. In the Verma et al. studies, results indicated that 25 of the 36 restaurants 
studied (69%) used enzymatic floor cleaners that require cold water to be effective, because hot 
water deactivates the enzymes. Block 2 represents a widespread assumption (or mental model) 
among the public that hotter water is more effective for cleaning than cooler water, and Verma et 
al. found that 62% of employees using enzymatic cleaners reported using warm or hot water 
when cleaning floors. By contrast, 98% of those using regular detergent-based cleaners 
appropriately used hot water. This mismatch may occur despite franchise mandates, training 
materials and guidance typically provided to store managers [Block 5] who, in turn, are 
responsible for selection and training of the supervisors and staff [Block 6] and making them 
aware of the cold-water requirements associated with the enzymatic cleaners.   In reality, control 
may be much more diffuse and less hierarchical.  
 Shift supervisors [Block 7] directly supervise the staff [Block 8], who actually do the 
work of mopping the floors [Block 9], that in turn impacts the state of the floors and therefore 
the likelihood of slips [Block 3]. The kitchen area floors are mopped at least once a day 
(typically during the night shift) and usually more often. This is important, because managers 
will generally not be present during the night shift. Thus, it will often be up to the shift 
supervisors to monitor whether cold water is used with the enzymatic cleaners. Managers may 
not be in a position to observe slips if and when they occur due to other responsibilities and shift 
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duration. Supervisors will probably only be aware of slips that result in injury or disruption of 
the normal workflow. Slips in the Verma et al. study were operationally defined in terms of 
weekly reports to the study team by individual participants.  They were characterized as ‘slips’ 
and ‘major slips,’ the latter resulting in fall or injury.   The exact process of what is reported to 
whom within specific restaurants seems to vary. Thus, the dashed feedback to management 
reflects uncertainty about how much information relative to both slips and floor cleaning 
activities is being reported back to managers. On the other hand, the responsibility to see that 
supervisors and staff have the appropriate training and that they are following appropriate 
procedures with regards to floor cleaning falls with the managers.  
A final factor that provides an important context for the interactions among managers, 
supervisors, and staff is the economic constraints [Block 1] that keep the staff salaries in fast 
food restaurants near minimum wage. Restaurants also employ a large percentage of part time 
employees (e.g., students, care-givers, etc.). Hence, there are potentially high levels of staff and 
supervisor turnover.  Additionally, many stores operate with longer hours and multiple shifts, 
raising the issue of situational awareness transmission between shift supervisors and work crews 
from shift to shift.  This interacts with the general public’s assumptions about the need for hot 
water [Block 2] to make worker training and supervision a continual concern. This high turnover 
rate will have important implications for the effectiveness of communications and decisions with 
respect to countering incorrect assumptions among the general public and preventing slips due to 
improper cleaning practices. Verma et al. recommended a combination of administrative and 
engineering controls including a dispensing station with a cold-water-only supply/control valve.   
 
2.3.  A sociotechnical systems perspective 
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The main purpose of this first section was to reinforce and emphasize a ‘Sociotechnical 
SYSTEMS’ approach to safety, with a very strong emphasis on the term ‘systems.’ As Leveson 
(2012) writes: 
The systems approach focuses on systems taken as a whole, not on the parts. 
It assumes that some properties of systems can be treated adequately only in 
their entirety, taking into account all facets relating the social to the technical 
aspects. These system properties derive from the relationships between the 
parts of systems: how the parts interact and fit together (p. 63). 
In particular, a systems perspective on safety starts with the premise that ‘safety’ is an 
emergent property of the organised complexity. This means that any attempt to understand or to 
improve system safety based on reductionist assumptions (e.g., an exclusive focus on eliminating 
specific human error or on increasing component software or hardware reliability) will have 
limited effectiveness at best, and at worst may lead to naïve models and interventions that can 
have potentially catastrophic unintended negative consequences. Each of the two cases 
introduced here illustrate the necessity of considering communications and decisions in the 
context of the larger social system within which they are embedded.  
In the case of the Millstone Power Station, it seems evident that the economic climate set 
the stage for the initial erosion of the safety culture and that the larger public (i.e., the attention 
of Time magazine) played a very important role in helping both the NRC and Northeast Utilities 
to recognize that there was a safety problem and to motivate them to initiate actions to make 
improvements.  Further, common industry patterns around directive management and mistrust 
between managers and workers made communication more difficult.  Additionally, in connecting 
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the dots between different actions (e.g., replacing top managers) and the ultimate safety 
consequences of those actions, it becomes necessary to consider couplings that involve multiple 
levels (e.g., the trust of workers and the education of middle management relative to the values 
of top level management, the regulatory demands, and the economic pressures).  
Similarly, in the case of slip-related injuries in the fast food industry, it seems quite 
obvious that effective interventions will have to be framed in the context of the economic 
environment that contributes to high worker turnover rates and the cultural environment that 
creates expectations about cleaning effectiveness that are violated by the enzymatic cleaning 
solutions. Thus, rational decisions about the choice of a cleaning detergent at the franchise level 
can have unintended negative consequences for worker safety.  
Now that the sociotechnical systems perspective has been established, the next section 
will specifically consider the implications for understanding and shaping communications and 
decision making with the goal of improving safety. In particular, communicating and deciding 
will be explored in the context of a set of interacting, nested closed-loop dynamics that span the 
multiple social layers illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
3.  Observing and controlling: a closed-loop perspective on communicating and deciding 
 
Figure 4 provides an alternative representation that illustrates the coupling across levels in a 
sociotechnical system as a nesting of closed-loop couplings. Although only a subset of the 
various couplings are represented in the figure, in principle, every element in this system can be 
influenced by output from every other element and all elements may be affected by independent 
disturbances. The first point that we want to make with regard to this representation is that the 
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arrows represent the flow of both ‘communications’ and ‘decisions.’ In fact, almost any activity 
in this system will have a dual role, both as a decision/action (e.g., firing a vice president; or 
choosing a detergent) and as a communication (e.g., reflected in the perceptions of staff about 
management safety values; or about the proper way to clean floors). In essence, all decisions are 
communications and most communications have potential impact on decisions and actions. In 
this context, the common distinction between communications and decisions breaks down, and 
attention shifts to the coupling between communications (i.e., perceptions) and decisions (i.e., 
actions) relative to stability in a multi-layered adaptive control system. As an alternative, we 
suggest that a distinction that becomes more relevant to the dynamics of the coupled system is 
the distinction between observing/observability and controlling/controllability, where 
observability focuses on the ability to monitor the states of the system (e.g., in relation to 
constructs such as organisational sensemaking, recognition primed decisions; situation 
awareness; common ground); and controllability focuses on the ability to influence the system or 
move it from one state to another (e.g., leadership, authority, and responsibility within the 
organisation). In complex organisations, observability will depend on effective communications 
and the effectiveness of decision-making can only be assessed relative to the constraints 
associated with controllability.  
-- Place Figure 4 about here -- 
Figure 5 provides two alternative visualizations to aid in our discussions of the 
observability and controllability problems within each of the component control systems within 
the larger sociotechnical system. Figure 5A emphasizes the functional relations within each 
component loop within the larger system, and Figure 5B emphasizes the multi-dimensional 
nature of the information flows associated with observing and controlling within each loop. The 
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centre of Figure 5A is labeled ‘integrated experiences’ – this is the heart of the sensemaking 
process. The term ‘integrated’ is used explicitly to emphasize that the outputs of this system (i.e., 
decisions, actions, expectations) are dependent on an extended history of past experiences. In the 
argot of cognitive psychology, this element might represent the ‘schema’ or ‘mental model’ that 
is guiding expectations and actions and that is simultaneously being shaped by the consequent 
experiences.  As Leveson (2012, p. 87) notes, ‘any controller – human or automated – needs a 
model of the process being controlled to control it effectively.’ However, this model is not 
stationary: it reflects learning (the integration of experience) over time. Also, it is important to 
note that the work itself (i.e., the process being controlled or problem being solved) is also 
changing over time. Thus, a changing internal model is a necessary component in an adaptive 
control system. 
The integrated experiences element is a component in three nested feedback loops. The 
inner-most loop represents the observation process with respect to direct work activities (e.g., 
operating a nuclear power plant; or washing floors). In this loop, expectations are compared to 
the outputs of the controlled process and the differences (i.e., surprise) are potentially fed back as 
inputs to the integrated experiences. The primary component of this inner loop reflects the 
sensitivity to (or the weight/gain, emphasis associated with, or attentiveness to) the feedback. 
This will determine the impact of a surprise at any specific time, relative to integrated prior 
experiences, in shaping the assessment of the situation. This loop might reflect the Millstone 
operators’ assessment of the state of the nuclear processes that they are operating; or in the case 
of the fast food industry, this might reflect a worker’s assessment of the requirements for 
cleaning floors.  
-- Place Figure 5 about here -- 
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The next inner-most loop represents the control loop, where outputs of the controlled 
process are compared to intentions and the differences (i.e., errors) are fed back as inputs to the 
integrated experiences. The block element in this loop represents the sensitivity to deviations 
from intentions. In simple control systems this component (e.g., the control gain) would 
determine the rate of responses to errors. However, more generally this might be analogous to 
the priority associated with actions toward satisfying the system objectives. Thus, this loop might 
reflect the decisions that operators at Millstone might make with regards to both controlling and 
maintaining the nuclear processes. In the case of the fast food industry, this loop might reflect the 
decisions of workers about what temperature of water to use to clean the floors. 
Note that in simple control systems the stability of the overall system will depend on the 
joint impact of both the control and observer components (e.g., gains). If the joint gain is too 
high, the system will ‘overreact’ and can actually make problems worse. If the joint gain is too 
low, then the system will be very slow and conservative in responding to problems. In a dynamic 
world where there are finite windows of opportunity to solve problems, inaction or responding 
too slow can also lead to instability. Thus, the gain elements reflect an important balancing act 
with respect to observability (differentiating signal from noise) and with respect to controllability 
(essentially a speed/accuracy tradeoff). 
The outer-most loop represents the input to a component control system from the other 
levels in the sociotechnical system. In this loop experiences are shaped by the feedback that is 
filtered through the larger socio-economic-political context. This loop will typically be 
integrating over longer time periods than the two inner loops, and the input from these levels can 
be best visualized as ‘constraints’ that shape the intentions (values and goals) and limit the 
degrees of freedom for selecting control solutions at the component level. These constraints can 
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be thought of as a ‘mental model’ that might include the goals, values, and alternatives that shape 
how information is integrated for both assessing the state of the system and for selecting the 
appropriate actions.    Ideally, in an adaptive system (e.g., a learning organisation), the feedback 
from this loop will reflect learning from successes and failures over the history of the 
organisation that might facilitate increasing ‘expertise’ with respect to a particular component 
control problem (i.e., smarter or more stable control solutions). In the Millstone case, this might 
reflect input to the operators from management and regulatory agencies with respect to the 
appropriate balance between efficiency and safety. Note that the messages may not be consistent 
and may vary over time. In the fast food industry case, this might reflect the instruction and 
guidance that workers receive from their management, as well as experiences in their everyday 
lives with respect to proper cleaning procedures (e.g., if enzymatic cleaners become more widely 
used, then widespread assumptions about water temperature might change).   
Although the signals in typical control diagrams such as Figure 5A are represented as 
single arrows, in sociotechnical systems these signals will typically reflect multiple sources of 
information with respect to multiple dimensions (i.e., states) of the control problem. Figure 5B is 
included to emphasize that in complex sociotechnical systems both the observation and control 
processes will involve multiple dimensions of feedback and multiple dimensions (i.e., 
possibilities or degrees of freedom) for action. In 5B the transfer function (e.g., the internal 
model) of the integrated experience component is represented as a network of weights (as 
opposed to a single gain as in Figure 5A) – where each box represents a differential weighting 
function for each of many inputs relative to each of the many outputs. This representation is akin 
to Brunswik’s (1956) Lens Model for perception. Note that the multiple signal lines do not 
represent nested control loops, but rather a single control loop that is multi-dimensional (i.e., 
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includes multiple sources of feedback and multiple action possibilities). However, we have 
embedded this in a second outer loop to reflect the potential for the weights in the ‘lens’ to be 
adjusted as a consequence of the internal model that is shaped by the coupling with other levels 
in the sociotechnical system. The wide arrow (labeled ‘learning’) reflects a process whereby the 
relative weights in the lens (i.e., the functional relationships or transfer function) are adjusted as 
a result of the couplings across levels in the sociotechnical system. In essence, the weights in the 
lens component of this system are one way to operationalize a changing ‘internal model’ (i.e., a 
mental model or implicit theory of action) that translates observations into expectations and/or 
that translates errors into action. Note that the lines in Figure 5B represent signals that are 
operated on by the functional relationships within the box (i.e., the weights in the lens) and 
translated into action. However, the wide learning arrow represents an operation on the 
functional relationships (i.e., changing the weights in the lens). Thus, the impact of learning from 
the broader experience associated with cross-level coupling within the larger system is to tune 
(or reshape) the dynamics of the multi-dimensional perception action loop. As noted earlier, the 
learning loop will be operating at a different (slower) time constant than the inner loop. Thus, for 
example, operators at Millstone may be receiving changing messages with respect to the 
appropriate emphasis on safety from management that will impact how they might approach 
maintenance of the system (e.g., employees who see management ignoring safety concerns may 
stop reporting the concerns or may voice those concerns through a different channel – 
complaining to regulatory agencies). In the case of the fast food industry, expectations based on 
a long history of using non-enzymatic cleaners will shape how workers might interpret the 
feedback with respect to slips in the workplace. For example, whether they attribute the slip to 
20	  	  
the cleanliness of the floors or to other factors and whether they respond by changing how they 
clean the floors. 
As we explore the constructs of observability and controllability in the context of 
complex sociotechnical systems, it is important to keep both Figures 4 and 5 in mind.  Every 
loop in Figure 4 represents distinct observer and controller constraints. Thus, every line in Figure 
4 represents multiple inputs and every box in Figure 4 contains its own ‘lenses’ for mapping 
these multiple inputs into expectations and actions. In addition, information that is essential to 
observability and controllability for one loop may be noise with respect to another loop. Thus, 
we are dealing with a network of observers and controllers that have to satisfy local stability 
constraints and also must coordinate to satisfy more global stability constraints. However, the 
general principles of observability and controllability can be applied both locally and globally.  
Thus, at a global organisational level we can talk about observability and controllability 
(e.g., organisational sensemaking and learning). These will depend on coordination across many 
local closed-loop dynamics at levels associated with units within the organisation and with 
individuals within the units. We can also consider local dynamics of observability and 
controllability (e.g., individual situation awareness and expertise). Thus, not only is there a need 
for balance within each loop, but there is also a potential need to balance stability demands 
within a loop against the demands of other loops in order to achieve a globally stable solution. 
For example, in the case of Millstone, the resources available for addressing safety concerns at 
the operator level will be constrained by decisions at another level with respect to meeting the 
demands for economic viability. In the case of the fast food industry, the potential benefits of 
choosing an enzymatic based cleaner at one level, must be assessed relative to the associated 
demands for training and supervision at another level.  
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In simple linear control systems, it is possible to separate the observer and controller 
functions into independent components that serially determine the stability of the sociotechnical 
system (e.g., see Pew and Baron, 1978). Thus, the ‘estimates’ of output by the observer become 
the inputs to the controller.  However, in complex, non-linear systems, the observer and 
controller functions will typically be inextricably coupled, jointly contributing to the integrated 
experiences that in turn shape actions and expectations.  Thus, it becomes impossible to 
disambiguate or disentangle the individual contributions to the system dynamics (i.e., as separate 
gains). For example, new leaders in the Millstone plant must simultaneously solve the safety 
problems, while they are still learning or discovering what the problems are. Thus, early actions 
may not have the intended consequences (with respect to the control problem), and the 
associated surprises will be potential information for adjusting the internal model of the state of 
the system (the observer problem).  
In Figure 5B the diagram can represent either the observer or the controller as isolated 
components in the forward loop; or it can represent the joint impact of both (i.e., the coordinated 
coupling of perception and action). In the second case, the weights at the nodes represent the 
internal model that coordinates expectations and actions. For pedagogical reasons we will begin 
by considering the observer and controller functions independently and then in a final subsection 
we will consider the joint implications for stability and safety. Ultimately, the stability of a 
control system will be a joint function of observability and controllability. Thus, we feel it is 
essential to approach them as complementary features of a single system, rather than as 
subsystems that can be understood in isolation.  
 
3.1.  Observing  
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For social scientists a good context for thinking about the observing problem is the theory of 
signal detectability. In essence, the problem is to infer the actual state of the system based on 
noisy observations. In particular, the problem is determining whether any particular observation 
(e.g., a safety problem or a slip) is simply associated with the natural complexity of the work 
domain, or whether that observation is symptomatic of a systemic problem that might require 
action. For example, in the case of Millstone, one might consider management’s problem of 
determining whether the safety complaints of the staff represented actual threats to the overall 
safety of the plant – or perhaps simply the complaints of unsatisfied or overly cautious workers 
who are not aware of the overall economic context. Would an investment in an employee 
concerns program simply be ‘a legal defense fund for bad employees?’ Or at another level 
consider the staff’s problem of determining whether management actions represented a genuine 
increased interest in improving plant safety or just a ploy to placate workers and regulators.  Was 
the management initiative to strengthen the employee concerns program simply a ‘look good and 
feel good’ gimmick? In the case of the fast food industry, consider the problem of a shift 
supervisor trying to determine whether a specific fall was due to the work conditions or to 
careless actions of an accident-prone employee. There will be evidence to support multiple 
attributions.  
 The key point, with respect to the signal detectability problem, is that solving the 
observer problem is not about finding an absolute truth. Rather, it is a problem of balancing one 
source of error against another. Reducing misses (increasing hits) comes at the cost of increasing 
false alarms. Thus, in the case of Millstone, responding immediately to make a change as a result 
of every concern voiced by employees would potentially result in much wasted money and effort. 
23	  	  
In this context, the observer problem becomes one of finding the right decision criteria for 
judging which complaints to act on and which complaints to ignore. In more colloquial terms, 
the question is to find the right level of trust. Too much trust results in wasted time and effort. 
Too little trust results in an erosion of safety leading to potential catastrophe. The key is to 
calibrate trust relative to the properties of signal and noise (the degree of uncertainty) and to the 
relative payoffs associated with the potential consequences, which themselves depend on context 
or history.  In an environment of mistrust, erring on the side of extra investment is probably 
wise; over time, as trust is developed, the effective level of trust changes (just as would be the 
case with any resource). 
The ‘gain/bias’ component in the inner loop of Figure 5A and the weights in Figure 5B 
reflect the calibration of the observer process. These components reflect the weights given to 
multiple sources of information relative to the expectations based on prior experience. In simple 
observer systems this might be implemented as a gain or weight that determines how much the 
estimate of the state of the system will be changed as a function of the current level of surprise. If 
the gain is high, then the system will dramatically change its expectation when there is a surprise. 
If the gain is low, then the system will tend to be conservative in changing its expectations. If 
gain is too high, the system will become unstable as it ‘chases’ the noise. If gain is too low, then 
the system will be sluggish in responding to real changes in the state of the work domain.  
 An important implication of taking the signal detection perspective on the problem is that 
a satisfactory or optimal solution cannot be specified without taking the larger context (e.g., the 
economic consequences) into account.  In other words, the social/economic/political context 
matters! Thus, in order to approach the observer problem with respect to determining satisfactory 
solutions (e.g., to choose an appropriate level of gain) it is necessary to take into account the 
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value systems (i.e., payoff matrix or cost function). In essence, the observer problem requires a 
sociotechnical systems perspective. 
 While the signal detection problem illustrates the need to balance one source of error 
against the other, the full complexity of the observer problem requires considering the dynamics 
of sampling over time and the potential that the situation is changing. In the Millstone case, the 
problem is not about responding to individual staff observations about particular safety issues, 
but rather integrating across many observations over months, years, and even decades. The 
Millstone plant had an excellent safety record and was noted for engineering excellence through 
the 1970s and 1980s. However, due to the changing economic environment (and perhaps due to 
growing complacency) the state of the organisation was changing (i.e., the safety culture was 
eroding and the expectations of external parties were rising), while the state of the industry was 
also changing with new technology and regulatory requirements, thus creating a gap of 
expectations among some stakeholders. The observer problem involves sampling over time to 
detect this gradual change. The expectation based on the history of operations through the 1970s 
and 1980s was that the Millstone systems were well managed and safe – however, that belief was 
no longer justified by the mid-1990s. However, this change could not be detected in any single 
observation - it involves detecting patterns over time. 
 In the case of slipping in the fast food industry, the magnitude of the problem is 
impossible to detect at the level of individual restaurants. In fact, Figure 3 suggests that the 
feedback loop with regards to the industry-wide slip problem is only closed at the level of large-
scale research projects conducted by scientists such as Verma et al., though individual 
organisations do aggressively pursue the issue internally. The number of slips reported or 
resulting in an injury experienced in a particular restaurant will be low (few samples) and the 
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magnitude of the noise (i.e., in terms of competing attributions) is immense. It is very easy to 
attribute any single slip to a multitude of factors such as individual carelessness. In this system, 
as in other systems (most notably healthcare) where accidents (errors) are local and incidents are 
distributed over many different units, it can be very difficult to detect a systemic problem. 
However, when the data are integrated across many units, the magnitude of the problem becomes 
more apparent. This illustrates one of the important roles for regulatory agencies and industry 
groups (e.g., The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) in the observer process – to integrate 
across large samples in order to detect significant safety issues that are hidden in the noise at 
more local levels. This is currently occurring at the injury level in the US Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA).  It is interesting to note that the problem of the enzymatic 
cleaners was a serendipitous discovery in a research program that was evaluating coefficients of 
friction relative to the cost/benefits of providing workers with slip resistant shoes.  
 In taking into account the dynamics associated with sampling and changing system states, 
it should be apparent that the capacity to sample, and thus the ability to differentiate signal from 
noise, will be different at each of the different layers in the sociotechnical system. The 
implication is that a satisfactory assessment of the state of a sociotechnical system is not possible 
without coordinating information across the various levels. No particular level at either Millstone 
or in the fast food industry has privileged access to understanding the complete state of the 
system. For example, while detecting the full magnitude of the slipping safety issue may require 
levels of integration that are possible only at higher levels in the sociotechnical system, 
improving the situation will typically depend on properties of lower level loops, such as the 
ability of managers to insure that supervisors and staff are trained to use the detergents properly.  
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 Another aspect of the observer problem that is not well represented in the signal detection 
paradigm (that is generally framed in the context of perception) is the need to actively explore in 
order to access information. A classic example in the control literature involves the problem of a 
driver detecting potential changes in driving dynamics (e.g., a change in road surfaces such as 
black ice; or a change in the braking dynamics due to wet brakes).  In order to detect the 
changing dynamics it will sometimes be necessary to act (e.g., jiggle the steering wheel; or tap 
the brakes) with the goal of creating feedback to ‘test’ for changes in the state of the system. In 
the Millstone report (Carroll & Hatkenaka, 2001) this is reflected in the discussion of ‘learning 
by doing.’ With regards to the observation problem, the new management was ‘surprised’ by the 
reactions of workers to firing contractors and disciplining managers. This surprise is an 
indication of a mismatch between the expectations of management and the actual state of the 
system.  The feedback from these actions was very important for building an accurate assessment 
of the state of the organisation – and for achieving an appropriate level of trust between 
management and staff. This illustrates a truism for effective observing – it is necessary to learn 
from mistakes, thus you have to make mistakes first in order to learn. Jiggling your steering 
wheel to test for black ice will be perceived as error with respect to the narrow goal of steering 
the car (i.e., controlling), but it may provide essential information with regards to the higher goal 
of driving safely. 
 We feel that there is a large degree of consensus in the literature about the significance of 
the observing problem in complex work environments. However, this consensus can be masked 
by the diverse jargon that has developed around this problem (e.g., situation awareness, 
recognition-primed decision-making, organisational sensemaking, common ground). For 
example, the terms ‘situation awareness’ and ‘recognition-primed decision-making’ have 
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emerged from research comparing individual novice and expert performance in complex 
environments. This research shows that much of the difference can be attributed to the ability of 
experts to accurately assess or ‘recognize’ the state of the situation. This literature suggests that 
the differential quality of meeting the observer demands of complexity accounts for much of the 
variance between individual novices and experts, rather than differential abilities to 
‘choose/decide’ or differential action capabilities. Individual experts are typically more accurate 
in assessing the state of the situation, and this assessment then translates into more effective 
action. The observer metaphor can provide a means for making generalizations from the 
literature on individual expertise to the problem of organisational sensemaking.  
 The term ‘common ground’ reflects the need for collaboration across many levels in an 
organisation in order to successfully accomplish complex work. This term arises in the 
communication literature and is viewed as an important pre-requisite for effective conversations 
(Clark & Brennan 1991). It has also been used in the organisational performance literature as a 
prerequisite for effective coordination (e.g., Convertino et al. 2011). As we noted earlier, the 
observation problem must be addressed in each of the many different control loops in an 
organisation. In terms of Figure 5B, each loop will have its own internal model (i.e., weights for 
integrating information through the lens) reflecting its own learning history. Thus, it can often be 
the case that the same objective event is perceived differently due to the different learning 
histories at different levels of the organisation. Or, the intention motivating a message at one 
level may be completely misunderstood by others who are interpreting the intention through a 
different lens. It seems fairly obvious that an important contributing factor to the erosion of 
safety in the Millstone plants was the disappearing common ground between management and 
staff. This probably resulted from changes in management (e.g., retirement of the founding CEO) 
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and the significant impact of the economic forces (e.g., impending deregulation) on the lens 
through which the new management was evaluating the state of the plants. 
 Common ground also figures significantly in the slipping problem in the fast food 
industry. The reality of enzymatic cleaners (i.e., require cold water to be effective) and the 
popular assumptions that many staff workers hold (i.e., hotter water is more effective) represents 
a clear disconnect between worker perceptions and the demands of the work. Thus, for example, 
guidance from management that clean floors are important for reducing slips might be perceived 
by workers as a requirement to use hotter water. A typical solution to this mismatch would be a 
training intervention directed to recalibrate the workers’ expectations (i.e., train them to use cold 
water with enzymatic cleaners). However, because of the high turnover rate at the staff level, this 
training will be a continuing problem, unless the popular assumptions change due to increasing 
availability and general use of enzymatic cleaners. Thus, it may be important to at least consider 
alternative changes that reduce the potential conflict with general public beliefs. Suggestions 
include, removing hot water sources, automating the mixing process so that workers don’t 
control the water temperature, or utilizing alternative detergents that are not enzymatic based.  
 In sum, to the extent that it is true that ‘perception is reality,’ the observer problem 
reflects the difficulty of coordinating among many potentially different realities reflecting the 
differential experiences of the many individuals and groups who must cooperate to achieve good 
results for the sociotechnical system. It seems obvious that in both cases a contributing factor to 
the safety problems was breakdowns in communications across levels (problems with 
observability).  For example, within the fast food industry we wonder if franchises appreciate the 
implications of their choice of an enzymatic cleaner on the slip rates. We wonder if managers 
know about the requirement to use cold water with enzymatic cleaners, whether they know about 
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what temperature water their employees are using, whether they are informed about specific slip 
incidents, or whether they are fully aware of the extent of the safety issue. We wonder if shift 
supervisors know about the requirements for cold water or the significance of the slip risks for 
the industry. We also wonder if they know to report slip incidents to managers. The overall 
impression we get from the recent studies of slips in the fast food industry is that information 
feedback is lacking, resulting in poor situation awareness throughout the system with regards to 
the slip problem. Again, this was a serendipitous discovery that surprised the researchers whose 
interest was the potential impact of nonslip shoes on safety. 
 
3.2.  Controlling 
  
As reflected in Figure 5, the control problem shares many properties with the observer problem. 
Whereas the observer problem is to integrate over experiences to make an accurate assessment of 
the situation, the control problem is to integrate over experiences to choose the right actions to 
satisfy the system goals or to minimize errors. Both problems involve integrating information 
from diverse sources over extended time histories and both problems are inherently closed-loop. 
Finally, both problems involve an inherent tradeoff associated with the ultimate sensitivity to 
feedback.  
 As with the observer problem, the effectiveness of simple control systems often depends 
on sensitivity to error (i.e., the loop gain). If the gain is too high, then the system will tend to 
overcorrect errors and in the extreme the system will become unstable. In the aviation domain, 
high gain is associated with the problem of ‘pilot induced oscillations,’ where the over-
corrections of the pilot lead to unstable control.  If the gain is too low, then the control system 
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will be sluggish or slow to correct errors. In finding the correct gain, a major constraint will be 
the time constraints associated with the control loop (e.g., lags and windows of opportunity 
associated with the effects of an action and delays associated with feedback about the impact of 
the actions). In general, when there are long delays between action and effect or feedback 
relative to the effect, then the range of stable gains will be very narrow, i.e., the system will be 
hard to control. In these cases, actions should be small and tentative in order to minimize the risk 
of instability.   
As with the observer, the optimal solution can only be determined relative to an external 
value system (i.e., cost function). Typically, value functions reflect the costs of both error and 
effort, as well as the anticipated benefits associated with the positive consequences of action. An 
optimal solution will minimize costs and maximize benefits, but given that multiple stakeholders 
experience costs and benefits differently, there will be necessary tradeoffs both within 
component control loops and across the loops at different levels in the larger sociotechnical 
system. In the context of Millstone, one example of a control problem was the challenge of 
responding to staff concerns in order to both improve safety and to improve the level of trust or 
confidence of the operators. Note that a good solution to the control problem is not simply to 
respond to every concern. It requires that management find an effective balance between the 
costs of action, the threats associated with the concerns, and other potential consequences such as 
the public perception and the political and economic implications of those perceptions.  
 Like the observer problem, the control problem in sociotechnical systems typically 
involves many interconnected loops spanning different levels within the system. In motor control, 
this is referred to as the ‘degrees of freedom’ problem. One aspect of this problem is that actions 
intended to correct errors within one loop can be disturbances with respect to other loops. Thus, 
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the net effect can be particularly unsatisfying. For example, bringing your head up too early 
when trying to ‘drive’ a golf ball can result in a very unsatisfying result. One of the challenges 
relative to solving the degrees of freedom problem is to ‘lock out’ a subset of control loops (e.g., 
fix your head position and lock the elbow of the leading arm) to minimize disturbances, so that 
control can be isolated to a few control loops that are particularly relevant to the goals. In 
sociotechnical systems, this has to do with authority and responsibility – which loops should be 
in control (determining the actions) and which loops should be ‘locked out’ from the action paths.  
The Millstone case clearly illustrates how actions intended to correct errors in one loop 
(e.g., disciplining the manager of oversight) can result in disturbances (i.e., unintended negative 
consequences) with respect to other control loops (e.g., building trust with the staff). Similarly, 
the fast food industry case illustrates how a decision at one level intended to improve conditions 
(e.g., the choice of a more effective enzymatic cleaner) may have unintended negative impact on 
control loops at lower levels due to the choice of hot water by staff who are also intending to get 
maximal cleaning effectiveness. Both loops are acting to achieve the same goal, but because of 
the coupling between the control loops the net effect is that actions at one level cancel or 
interfere with the actions at another level with a net unsatisfying result.  
 
3.3.  Sensemaking/muddling through 
  
As noted in the opening of this section, the quality of the overall system performance will 
depend jointly on its ability to respond effectively to both the observer demands associated with 
detecting the signals in the noise and the control demands associated with the speed/accuracy 
constraints for correcting deviations from intentions (i.e., errors).  The sensitivity to surprise in 
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updating situation awareness and the sensitivity to error with respect to deciding and acting will 
determine the system’s capability to appropriately satisfy the stakeholder value propositions 
against which system performance will be assessed (e.g., see Rudolph et al. 2009). 
 The complexity of the joint demands of observing and controlling in complex 
sociotechnical systems and the implications for effective decisions and action have been well 
articulated in Lindblom’s (1959; 1979) classic papers on ‘muddling through’ and more recently 
in Weick’s (1995) construct of ‘organisational sensemaking.’ For example, Lindblom’s construct 
of muddling, where he suggests that effective policy making in complex organisations involves 
an incremental approach of trial and error, as opposed to any formally computational approach to 
making absolutely right decisions, is consistent with the observing and controlling framework 
suggested here. Or consider Weick’s observations about the need to ‘act into’ situations and then 
make sense of the consequences retrospectively in order to shape future decisions.  This fits 
nicely with the metaphor of an organisation that acts to simultaneously achieve goals (control) 
and to generate information needed to evaluate beliefs (observe).  
In a retrospective assessment of ‘muddling through’ Lindblom (1979) writes: 
Perhaps at this stage in the study and practice of policy making the most common 
view (it has gradually found its way into textbooks) is that indeed no more than small 
or incremental steps - no more than muddling - is ordinarily possible. But most 
people, including many policy analysts and policy makers, want to separate the 
‘ought’ from the ‘is.’ They think we should try to do better. So do I. What remains as 
an issue, then? It can be clearly put. Many critics of incrementalism believe that 
doing better usually means turning away from incrementalism. Incrementalists 
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believe that for complex problem solving it usually means practicing incrementalism 
more skillfully and turning away from it only rarely.  
 This observation seems to be consistent with the constraints associated with stability of 
the joint observing/controlling problem. For example, from the point of view of managers 
changing policy in complex sociotechnical systems, there will typically be long lags between the 
implementation of a change in policy and the ultimate feedback that results from the percolation 
of that change through the many nested control loops in the system.  In the food industry, the 
impact of choosing an enzymatic detergent on worker safety will only be apparent in the long run 
(integrating over many restaurants over long periods). Thus, consistent with the demands for 
stability, it is prudent to make small changes and to take time to monitor the impact of those 
changes (i.e., it is prudent to take an incremental approach).   However, when managing a crisis, 
involving lives or money, it may be necessary to take larger actions.  As the Millstone case 
illustrates, even a larger action, such as replacing managers, is but one iteration in a change 
process that requires feedback and adjustment, i.e., muddling. 
 While Lindblom’s advice seems wise with respect to higher-level policy decisions (e.g., 
at the level of regulatory agencies and top management), his analysis does not address the many 
layers of nested control loops in a complex sociotechnical system. Thus, for example, correcting 
the safety culture in an organisation like Millstone does not depend simply on a single change in 
management policy, but rather depends on multiple actions implemented at multiple levels. This 
included replacing vice presidents, hiring new people to manage the employee safety concern 
programs, encouraging employees to contribute and take risks by doing the right thing (which 
formerly got them in trouble with management), and ultimately training line managers to be 
more receptive (better listeners/observers) and more responsive (higher gain controllers) to the 
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concerns of the staff. Thus, while a low gain, incremental approach may be generally wise with 
respect to management policy, implementing these changes may require enabling people lower 
in the organisation to be more responsive (higher gain) to local problems/demands. 
 The need to distribute authority to lower levels in an organisation is a common 
observation associated with organisations that have to cope with high risks in dynamic 
environments. This is consistent with the requirement that for coordination in a complex multi-
level sociotechnical system, it is necessary to match the controller’s authority with the observer’s 
capability for each control loop. Thus, stability often depends on empowering those with unique 
access to local information to act on that information, rather than to pass that information up the 
chain and to wait for authorization from a higher authority.  In military systems, this is 
recognized in the construct of ‘command intent’ (Shattuck 2000). The idea is that top levels 
within the organisation set general guidance about the overall goals (e.g., the tactical objectives) 
and the choices associated with specific actions are left to lower levels (e.g., field officers) who 
have direct information about the local situations. In these dynamic contexts, formally 
hierarchical organisations become flatter to behave more like heterarchies or networks when 
dealing with high tempo risks. That is, authority for action shifts to lower levels in the hierarchy, 
as a function of shifts in access to information.  Thus, for both the Millstone and slipping cases, 
it will be important to consider whether decisions are being made at the appropriate levels. For 
example, could franchises advise managers about the trade-offs associated with enzymatic and 
non-enzymatic cleaners and let them decided what type of cleaner will work best for a particular 
restaurant? 
 There are several properties that seem to differentiate organisations in terms of their 
ability to cope with the observing/controlling demands in complex environments. First, these 
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organisations often have rich communication networks (e.g., voice loops). These networks can 
help increase accesses to information (although they can also be a source of noise) relative to the 
observing problem, to help insure that the right hand knows what the left hand is doing in order 
to potentially reduce interference from control actions in multiple loops (e.g., Patterson et al. 
1999).  
Second, high reliability systems often have high levels of mobility across the levels and 
within levels. For example, this might reflect people starting at the bottom and moving up 
through levels of the organisation. Or it might reflect a policy of cross-training or job switching 
so that people have shifting jobs or responsibilities over their careers. This is useful because 
people have an opportunity to see the problem from many different perspectives (e.g., Rochlin et 
al. 1987).  This helps the individual internal models to converge on common ground and to make 
local actions (both communications and decisions) that take into account the larger context.  
Finally, high reliability systems typically have flexible allocation of control authority. 
This allows the system to self-organise into locally smart units or microsystems, where the 
people with the most relevant information (i.e., most direct access to relevant feedback) are 
empowered to make local decisions informed by the global guidance (i.e., command intent) from 
above. Thus, the system can have high gain locally to respond to dynamic threats, without the 
risks of instability that can result from long lags in the control loops associated with 
communications to and from a centralized authority. Of course, if local authority is not 
coordinated within the overall context (i.e., common ground and global intent), then instability is 
likely. Again, it is important to emphasize the need for balance between empowering local 
components to act, on the one hand, and constraining them so that their actions are coordinated 
with the actions and demands associated with other components, on the other. In dealing with 
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complexity this means finding a stable middle ground between hierarchical and anarchical forms 
of organisation.  
 
 
4.  Discussion and conclusions: implications for improving coordination in sociotechnical 
systems 
 
The control theoretic framework suggested here is intended as a guide for improving intuitions 
about the dynamics of sociotechnical systems, but it is in no way an answer, solution, or 
prescription for success. Also, we are not suggesting the application of analytic control models 
for building either simulations or models of these systems. Even if building accurate analytic 
models were possible, the models themselves would be at such a level of complexity that their 
behavior would be no less surprising than that of the systems they represented. If there is a value 
to this abstract framework, it is as a guide for generalizing from one sociotechnical system to 
another, both in terms of potential problems and in terms of potential solutions. It can also be a 
guide for generalizing across research programs at different scales. For example, it might help us 
to see parallels from the literature on naturalistic decision making that are relevant to the 
literature on organisational sensemaking; or it might help us to see parallels from the literature 
on skilled motor coordination with the literatures on team coordination and distributed work. 
 In the opening to this chapter we made the claim that ‘Context Matters!’ when it comes to 
specifying the boundaries of a cognitive system, thus motivating a sociotechnical perspective. 
However, when it comes to practical solutions, we claim that ‘Details Matter!’ The ultimate 
value of the control theoretic framework is to provide a holistic view to help guide our 
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explorations of the details. As such, it can suggest ways to bound our explorations (i.e., to help 
us to identify the sociotechnical system), highlight the details that might make patterns more 
evident and perhaps more sensible, and suggest structures and measures (e.g., delays in feedback 
loops) that may be particularly relevant to system performance.  But this framework provides no 
easy answers. The biggest potential mistake in applying this framework would be to trivialize the 
problems of communication and decision-making to fit tractable analytic solutions. Our own 
experiences with this framework is that it helped us to discover that the problems are often more 
complex than they first appeared, and definitely more complex than suggested by simple analytic 
models of observers and control mechanisms.  
 
4.1.  Implications for practice 
 
Our reframing of communication and decision-making practices in terms of observability and 
controllability has several important implications for managing safety in complex sociotechnical 
systems.  First, we must be able to ‘see the system.’  The frameworks we have presented provide 
an outline of the multi-level and multi-stakeholder relationships that constitute organisations, 
whether fast-food chains, nuclear power plants, or other entities.  Only when we recognize that 
microsystems such as a work shift are embedded in departments, organisations, industries, etc. 
can we begin to map and understand the communication interfaces and decision points, and then 
to develop recommendations for improving observability and controllability to meet safety 
goals.  This provides a framework for encouraging managers and policy makers at multiple 
levels to engage broadly with the social system, seeking diverse viewpoints, discussing shared 
values and goals, achieving common ground, and developing creative ideas.  An effective 
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process might produce not only an accurate and useful set of information, but also contribute 
toward improving the climate of mutual understanding, respect, trust and collaboration that could 
enable improvements in both productivity and safety. 
In the fast food and Millstone cases, seeing the system and engaging more representatives 
of the system were and are challenges.  Research on slips and falls in the fast food industry is 
sparse.  Only recently are we beginning to understand the full system.  Epidemiological research 
by itself only hints at the complex processes underlying accident rates.  Regulators, franchise 
owners, managers, and shift supervisors have very distinct, local understanding of their part of 
the system.  Mandates from above do not necessarily work, as demonstrated by the failure to 
implement the required cleaning practices.  At Millstone, the new CNO did not understand the 
sociotechnical system, despite having worked at Millstone early in his career and having years of 
experience running another nuclear power plant.  His understanding grew when he admitted to 
mistakes and created conditions to engage more people in the change process. 
The above discussion introduces the second point, that rich communication channels and 
venues are needed to share information and interpretations.  For a system to coordinate complex 
operations, please multiple stakeholder groups, and adapt to internal and external changes, there 
must be a great deal of communication in all directions.  In order for such communication to 
occur effectively, the people involved have to have sufficient trust and shared values and goals 
such that they are willing to speak up, and listen. In addition, they need to actively build common 
ground so that they can understand concerns associated with components that are distinct from 
their own local perspective. A well-functioning organisation is full of formal and informal 
communication opportunities, from regular meetings (whether in person or virtual) to informal 
networks and gathering places where people come together naturally.  The organisation also 
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matches the communication needs and opportunities, so that meetings are held only when they 
are appropriate for coordination, co-creation, and community building.  Fast food restaurants that 
have managers on day shift with important work going on during night shift must find some 
compensatory mechanisms for increasing observability and controllability, whether occasional 
manager visits at night or delegation of tasks to shift supervisors, lead workers, specialized safety 
roles, or self-managed work teams. 
The third point is that in complex systems, decision-making is distributed and 
dynamic.  Decisions relevant to safety are occurring all the time, in different locations in the 
organisation.  In the fast food case, decisions about cleaning strategies are made in one location, 
hiring decisions are made elsewhere, training materials are developed in yet another place, and 
so on.  The fact that in a sociotechnical system the ability of workers to wash floors with enzyme 
cleaners involves an interaction among these decisions appears to be opaque to many of the store 
managers and franchise owners.  As you change one feature of the floor cleaning process, the 
consequences reverberate through many interdependent decisions, but the nature of those 
consequences may be separated in time and space from the decisions themselves.  We know that 
systems with long delays and many interrelated cause-effect relationships are hard to understand 
and hard to manage (Perrow 1999, Sterman 2000).   
A core theme running through the fast food and Millstone cases is the level of trust 
between workers and managers, or between departments of an organisation.  We know that trust 
strongly affects the flow of information.  Trust also affects the nature of decision-making in 
terms of who is willing to make a decision, who participates in the decision process, who is 
willing to implement a decision made by others, and so forth.  We know that trust is difficult to 
win, and easy to lose.  It would be helpful to understand these relationships in more detail, 
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particularly how levels of complexity, levels of hazard, and levels of trust interact.  The fast food 
industry seems to trust the expertise of technical experts in central locations, but not the expertise 
of workers actually doing the job.  This is exacerbated by the high turnover and variable 
language skills among the lowest level workers.  But is this a self-fulfilling prophesy in which 
mistrust breeds ignorance and resistance?  That is what happened for a time at Millstone, where 
workers automatically assumed that anything management wanted must be bad for the 
workforce.  Over time, management was able to build trust, primarily by actions rather than 
words.  
It may be illustrative to compare the preceding discussion with current understanding of 
best practices in the area of management of occupational health. Fortunately ANSI/AIHA Z10-
2012: Occupational Health and Safety Management System (AIHA 2012) has just been released.  
The scope and purpose of this standard is to provide minimum requirements for a management 
program to reduce the risk of occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities.  
Figure 6 below (Figure 2 from Z10-2012) reveals that this standard is based on a 
Deming-type continuous improvement framework.   As will be seen, there are a number of 
elements in the standard that are consistent with the observing/controlling framework just 
developed.  
-- Place Figure 6 about here -- 
This continuous, closed-loop improvement, requires top management to take an active 
role in establishing and maintaining the OHSMS program [Policy Management Leadership and 
Employee Participation (Step 3.0)].  Included in this mandate are requirements to: (a) insure that 
the program is integrated with other relevant business units (e.g., inclusion of OSH objectives in 
manager performance reviews); and (b) insure meaningful employee participation in planning, 
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implementation, and checking and corrective action, at a minimum (Steps 4.0, 5.0, 6.0 in Figure 
6).  Note that, at least in principle, avoiding organisational ‘silos’ and engaging employees in 
meaningful participation addresses important issues seen in both Millstone and the fast food 
restaurants.  In particular, Appendix C addresses the question of organisational readiness, with 
explicit discussion of trust in management and barriers to communication, accurate reporting and 
participation.    
Step 4.0, Planning, is essentially a statement of the organisation’s observability problem.   
The requirements include organisational level risk assessment, establishment of priorities, and 
setting of objectives based on these priorities.  As such, they include specific language requiring 
the identification of: ‘…underlying causes and other contributing factors leading to hazards and 
risks.’  Presumably this language would afford a broad sociotechnical perspective on the problem. 
Appendix D addresses specific examples of contributing factors arising from organisational 
practices from other business functions.    
The core concern of Step 5.0, Implementation and Operation, is risk assessment.   Risk 
assessment is based on the traditional hierarchy of hazard controls:  elimination, substitution, 
engineering controls, warnings, administrative controls, personal protective equipment.    This 
section applies to both existing systems and design of new systems. Explicit requirements for 
addressing communication and training issues are provided.   Very detailed supporting 
appendices are provided.  While the bulk of the material in these appendices deals with 
traditional (micro level) approaches to assessment, there is an interesting discussion of change 
management; i.e. what is required to assure safety when there is a change in processes, practices, 
or equipment.  The observability/controllability issues reflected in this discussion can easily be 
mapped onto the change processes discussed in Millstone.  At the same time, there seems to be a 
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deliberate attempt, through communication and training, to increase the salience of safety issues 
within the cognitive maps of employees across all levels of the organisational structure.  
Step 6.0, Evaluation and Corrective Action, is essentially a statement of the 
organisation’s controllability problem with respect to OHSMS.  Compliance with the standard 
requires assessing existing levels of risk and carrying out corrective actions if they exceed some 
criteria. This is accomplished through various hazard assessment tools, development of leading 
indicators, and use of incident reports.   With respect to Figure 5A, it could be argued that the 
focus of Step 6.0 is on the gain control in the outer loop (action), whereas the focus of Step 4.0 is 
on the gain control in the inner loop (assessment).  Additionally, the outcomes of the corrective 
actions accomplished are fed back to the employee participation process, ongoing planning 
process and management review.  
 This information is used to help determine the underlying causes and other 
factors contributing to the system or risk control failures, and hence, is used to 
establish revised objectives and implementation plans.  This feedback loop is 
an essential component of the continual improvement of the OHSMS. (AIHA 
2012, p.27.)         
With respect to Figure 5B, such feedback could be represented by the large ‘training’ 
arrow representing long-term changes in weightings of individual components of the lens.         
Finally, Step 7.0, Management Review, can be viewed as comprising top management’s 
observability and controllability problem. With respect to Figure 4, we can assume nested sets of 
control loops with the information content from step 6.0 being an important input to the higher-
level control problem. 
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In general, the Z10-2012 standard addresses many of the important 
observability/controllability issues discussed earlier in this paper.  The question, however, is 
whether the overall flavor of a sociotechnical framework is present.  While there are several clear 
references to interdependencies and multiple layers of causality, most of the specific tools and 
checklist in the Appendices lack any explicit methods of identifying such interdependencies.  
This would seem to be an important area of future research within the framework described 
within this paper. 
  
4.2.  Implications for research 
… my father would take me for walks in the woods and would tell me various 
interesting things … Looking at a bird he says, ‘Do you know what that bird 
is? It’s a brown throated thrush; but in Portuguese it’s a … in Italian a …,’ 
he says ‘in Chinese it’s a …, in Japanese a …,’ etcetera. ‘Now,’ he says, ‘you 
know in all the languages you want to know what the name of that bird is and 
when you’ve finished with all that,’ he says, ‘you’ll know absolutely nothing 
whatever about the bird. You only know about humans in different places and 
what they call the bird. Now,’ he says, ‘let’s look at the bird.’ (Richard 
Feynman, 1999, p. 4). 
 When we look at the research literature with respect to communication, decision-making, 
and organisational performance, we see an expanding argot of terms to describe the performance 
dynamics: situation awareness, recognition-primed decision making, naturalistic decision making, 
ecological rationality, situated action, organisational sensemaking, high-reliability organisations, 
learning organisations, macro-cognition, common ground, embodied cognition, distributed 
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cognition, resilient organisations, metacognition,  organisational readiness, etc. On the bright 
side, this expansion reflects an increasing appreciation for the complex dynamics of 
sociotechnical systems. However, the potential dark side is when the exploding argot becomes an 
obstacle to understanding these dynamics (e.g., Flach 2008). We worry that this not only creates 
confusion and unproductive debates within the specific fields of human factors and cognitive 
systems engineering, but it also has the potential of isolating these fields from other disciplines 
that can potentially contribute toward the scientific and practical challenges presented by 
sociotechnical systems. 
 The science of sociotechnical systems is itself a sociotechnical system. Thus, the proverb: 
‘Physician, heal thyself’ comes to mind. Our experience in writing this paper illustrates the value 
of multi-discipline research teams.  We worry that within the field we are losing common ground 
and we think that a first step toward recapturing common ground would be to reconsider some of 
the new insights reflected in the expanding argot relative to the foundations of general systems 
theory.  Which of the new terms reflect truly unique phenomena, and which of the new terms 
simply amplify insights that can be articulated equally well in the language of general systems 
theory? Thus, we want to again emphasize that the systems perspective offered here is not 
intended as the ‘answer’ to either theoretical or practical issues associated with safety in 
sociotechnical systems. Rather, we simply believe that it offers a potential common ground 
where both collaborations and debates within the communities of researchers and practitioners 
might be more productive.  
 The other major impact of a dynamical systems perspective on sociotechnical 
organisations is that it requires that we change the underlying scientific narrative. That is, it 
requires that we change the research focus from narratives based on causes that determine 
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performance trajectories to narratives that focus on constraints that shape fields of possibilities. 
For example, Juarrero (1999) writes: 
Understanding all cause as collision-like, and the explanatory ideal as 
deduction from deterministic laws, are two examples of a trend that has 
characterized the history of philosophy for over two thousand years: the 
progressive elimination of time and context from metaphysics and 
epistemology. Since time and context play a central role in all living things, 
including human beings and their behavior, action theory is thus an excellent 
prism that refracts and separates two key problems in the history of Western 
philosophy – cause and explanation- and lays bare the role that time and 
context play in each. The first claim of this book is that an inadequate, 350-
year-old model of cause and explanation underlies contemporary theories of 
action. ( p. 3). 
 The observer/controller metaphors are important steps for bringing both ‘time’ and 
‘context’ back into the theoretical landscape. Today, the emerging field of nonlinear dynamics 
(e.g., chaos theory) is providing an alternative narrative to the old ‘mechanistic’ view of 
causality. This has important practical consequences for the basic research agenda. 
 First, this approach dethrones laboratory research designed to isolate causal trajectories 
from its privileged position as the principal tool for research. For example, standard research 
practices to insure that stimulation is completely ‘controlled’ by the experimenter typically 
‘break’ the closed-loop dynamics that are fundamental to observing and controlling. Thus, for 
experimental work, the focus needs to shift from an almost exclusive emphasis on ‘experimental 
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control’ (i.e., internal validity) to an increased emphasis on ‘representative design’ (i.e., external 
validity) (e.g., Brunswik 1956, see also Kirlik 2006).  
Additionally, the control theoretic context suggests a new framework for thinking about 
what ‘representative’ means. The challenge is not to make the laboratory identical to the natural 
phenomenon, but rather to make the dynamics of the control and observer problems in the 
laboratory representative of the natural phenomenon (e.g., in terms of the number of variables, 
the sources of uncertainty, the types of coupling between multiple information and action paths).  
 A shift toward more concern with making our laboratory tasks more representative of the 
natural phenomenon demands that we can characterize the dynamics of the natural phenomenon 
that we hope that our laboratory work will generalize to. Thus, there is an increased need for 
naturalistic observations of sociotechnical systems and associated approaches such as work 
analysis (e.g., Flach et al. 2004, Vicente 1999) to provide insights into the dynamics of work 
situations. Again, in describing field observations it will be necessary to shift attention from a 
search for the ‘root causes’ of a phenomenon to a way to characterize the constraints that shape 
the flows of information and the possibilities for actions (e.g., Leveson 2012).  
 The narrative with respect to theories, models and simulations will also have to change. 
In classical paradigms the primary focus was on predicting specific trajectories of behavior. In 
the control theoretic paradigm the focus needs to shift to mapping out the boundaries (e.g., state 
space representations) that constrain access to information and possibilities for action relative to 
value systems (e.g., multiple goals and payoff matrices). As with other nonlinear phenomenon 
(e.g., weather systems) these models will be vulnerable to butterfly effects – such that small local 
changes may have dramatic impacts on the predictions of behavioral trajectories. Thus, the 
models will not allow precise predictions about the specific trajectory of any sociotechnical 
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system, but they will support broad generalizations about regions of possibilities. For example, it 
will be possible to talk in general about properties (e.g., rich information networks) that might 
contribute to improving the resilience of an organisation for adapting to change.  But it may not 
be possible to ever predict the specific impact of any particular action or decision.  
 It is important to realize that these limitations with respect to predicting behavioral 
trajectories are not unique to cognitive or sociotechnical systems and it does not imply that these 
systems are not lawful. Rather, the limitations of science and predictions reflect actual limits on 
observability and controllability with respect to the complexity of all natural systems. As 
Mandelbrot notes, even a problem such as determining the length of a coastline can become 
problematic when we recognize the limits of the classical assumptions that have guided the 
‘causal’ narratives: 
If coastlines are ever to become an object of scientific inquiry, the uncertainty 
concerning their lengths cannot be legislated away. In one manner or another, 
the concept of geographic length is not as inoffensive as it seems. It is not 
entirely ‘objective.’ The observer invariably intervenes in its definition. 
[Mandelbrot 1983, p. 27] 
In the same way that weather systems and other nonlinear phenomenon test the limits of 
simple physical models, sociotechnical systems test the limits of simple cognitive and 
organisation models. The question is do we retreat back into our laboratories and the narratives 
based on the billiard ball metaphor, or do we embrace the complexity? This second path requires 
us to explore alternative dynamical system metaphors and it requires that we immerse ourselves 
into the phenomenon of natural sociotechnical systems. At present, the use of general systems 
frameworks, such as the ones we have presented in this paper, is as much art as science. In sum, 
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the point of the control theoretic framework that we have presented here is not to provide a 
simple solution to any specific safety problem. Rather, the point is to consider ways that we can 
scale up the scientific narrative to better explore the full complexities of sociotechnical systems.  
Part of the theoretical challenge will be to map out the space of relations among three 
dimensions of sociotechnical systems that must be explored: 1) the demands created by different 
work domains; 2) the types of organisational and social structures; and 3) the opportunities 
afforded by advancing technologies. Figure 7 illustrates the space that needs to be more fully 
explored in order to achieve a science of sociotechnical systems that can potentially address 
some of the practical challenges associated with the design of safer, more productive systems. 
-- Place Figure 7 about here -- 
4.2.1.  Differential demands of work domains 
The two cases presented in this paper where chosen to represent very different types of work 
domains. At one end of the work demand spectrum, there are systems that are tightly constrained 
by physical processes such as nuclear power and aviation systems. In these domains, there will 
typically be a steep information gradient from the sharp end of the system, where the operators 
live, up the chain to management and ultimately to regulatory and political decision makers. In 
such systems, operators will typically be in a privileged position with respect to access to 
information and capability to meet the dynamic control demands relevant to the overall safety of 
the processes. Higher levels in these organisations will typically impact safety through the 
selection and training of these operators and by insuring that these operators have the resources 
(e.g., information) and authority they need to make smart decisions with regards to directly 
managing the process.  
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 The cases of slips in the fast food industry and medical errors represent another end of the 
work domain continuum. In these systems, processes are highly variable (e.g., every restaurant 
and every patient is slightly different than the others) and highly distributed (e.g., each 
component at the sharp end has a restricted access to information). Thus, in considering safety 
relative to situations like slip accidents and medical errors, it will be difficult to identify 
problems at the sharp end of the system, because there will be limited samples and many sources 
of variability (e.g., clumsy individual or unsafe conditions). For these systems, the problems 
often can only be observed through integration over larger samples than are available to those 
working at the sharp end of the system. In fact, the people in these systems are often quite 
surprised to discover the magnitude of the problem when the data is aggregated and examined 
(e.g., Brennan et al. 1991, Institutes of Medicine 1999). As noted earlier, the discovery of the 
problems with enzymatic cleaners was found in a research program to examine the potential of 
slip resistant shoes for reducing slipping accidents. 
 
4.2.2.  Differential types of organisations 
A second dimension of the theoretical space requires consideration of the different types of 
organisational structures. For example, Toffler and Toffler (1997) write:  
The truth is that in both the economy and the military we still do not know 
how to organise, enhance, protect, and deploy the new intangibles for 
maximum benefit. Most businesses have not yet learned that to get the most 
out of information technology requires substantial reconceptualization and 
reorganisation of the work to be done… (p. xv). 
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  There is a long history of debate over different organisational structures with regards to 
economic systems (e.g., centralized versus free market economies). For example, Hayek (1945) 
provided strong arguments about the weakness of centralized control structures for managing 
large economies. In essence, he argued that the time constants associated with acquiring the 
information needed to make smart decisions was simply too great to allow stable control with a 
centralized organisation. On the other hand, he noted that distributed control systems needed 
some degree of structure to insure access to the information needed to establish common ground 
for coordinated action: 
We need decentralization because only thus can we insure that the knowledge 
of the particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. But 
the ‘man on the spot’ cannot decide solely on the basis of his limited but 
intimate knowledge of the facts of his immediate surroundings. There still 
remains the problem of communicating to him such further information as he 
needs to fit his decisions into the whole pattern of changes of the larger 
economic system (p. 524 – 525). 
 In the military domain, there has been extensive discussion of the relative effectiveness of 
hierarchical versus network forms of organisation. For example, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997) 
assert that: 
… the information revolution favors and strengthens network forms of 
organisation, while making life difficult for hierarchical forms. The rise of 
network forms of organisation – particularly ‘all-channel networks,’ in which 
every node can communicate with every other node – is one of the single most 
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important effects of the information revolution for all realms: political, 
economic, social, and military (p. 5). 
 However, Hayek’s caution about the need for information constraints in distributed 
economic systems is echoed in the constructs of ‘command intent’ and ‘imparting presence’ in 
the military domain (Shattuck, 2000). These constructs emphasize that discretion for junior 
officers in a military organisation to take initiative to adapt to local constraints must be 
constrained by a common ground with regards to the global mission.  
 Observations of high reliability systems (e.g., Rochlin et al. 1987) suggest that there may 
not be a single stable organisational structure. Rather, these systems appear to ‘self-organise’ to 
meet the changing demands of hazardous work domains. In self-organising systems, there may 
be a heterarchical form of control, where there is a changing locus of centralized control that 
shifts as a function of access to the information and resources needed to keep pace with rapidly 
changing processes.  
 Sage and Cuppan (2001) describe another organisational structure that seems to be 
emerging as a strategy for coping with complex domains such as emergency operations in 
response to large-scale disasters (e.g., Flach et al. in press). This is the ‘Federation of Systems.’ 
This is described as a specific class of system-of-systems where multiple component systems 
collaborate, yet there is ‘little central power or authority for command and control’ (p. 327). 
These components (e.g., hospitals, police, fire, and relief organisations at state and federal levels) 
join in a coalition to meet the common needs of the federation (e.g., to respond to a regional 
disaster). Sage and Cuppan (2001) outline five characteristics of Federalist organisations: 
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1. Subsidiarity. This suggests that power or authority for making decisions should belong to 
the lowest possible point in the organisation. This is consistent with other observations about 
the power of decentralized network forms of organisation.  
2. Interdependence. Cooperation is required to meet the common goals of the Federation, but 
pluralism is encouraged to avoid excessive centralization that inhibits local adaptability. This 
reflects the need for common ground among distributed control elements. In terms of Figure 
4, this reflects the fact that each control loop is nested within larger control loops that 
constrain the possibilities for control.  
3. Uniform and standardized ways of doing business. This is an essential component to 
creating the common ground needed for cooperation between the component units in the 
federal system. This is necessary for communications across the different levels of control in 
Figure 4. 
4. Separation of Powers. This suggests that managing, governing, and operating federalist 
systems require different bodies. This reflects the different organisational levels identified by 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) and Leveson (2012) and the nested control loops illustrated 
in Figure 4.  
5. Dual Citizenship. Individuals have dual responsibilities associated with their roles within the 
component organisations and within the larger federation. This emphasizes the coupling 
across component control loops illustrated in Figure 4.  
 These are just a few examples that reflect different types of organisations, with some 
indication of the differential demands on observability and controllability. While there are many 
claims about the benefits and demands of alternative forms of organisation, there is a need for a 
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global theoretical framework to differentiate across organisation types and to specify the 
implications of specific forms of organisations with regards to communication and control.  
 
4.2.3.  Technological opportunities 
It seems apparent that the evolution of sociotechnical systems and the associated interests of both 
scientists and practitioners is being driven in part by the opportunities afforded by emerging 
information technologies. These technologies are transforming both the nature of work and the 
nature of organisations. In terms of work, there is a trend for increased distance between workers 
and the products of work. As Rochlin (1997) observes, in the industrial age work shifted from 
direct production of goods and services to the operation of production machinery; in the 
information age work is shifting further away from production, such that workers are now often 
managing computers that control the production machinery. In terms of organisations, 
information technologies are now allowing information and control to be distributed in ways that 
allow real-time collaborations across distances that would have been unthinkable a generation 
ago.  
It should be clear that while information technologies support new opportunities for 
collaboration across space and time, these technologies do not determine the forms of the 
organisations. However, in the absence of a theoretical framework, the opportunities afforded by 
these technologies for short term increased efficiencies may lead to the design of brittle systems 
that undermine overall safety or long term stability. In particular, Rochlin (1997) highlighted the 
need to differentiate between ‘waste or slop’ versus ‘slack’ or ‘necessary friction.’ Slack and 
necessary friction refer to the buffering capacity that allows organisations and social systems to 
maintain stability in the face of unanticipated variability. In essence, Rochlin is highlighting the 
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balancing act that all control systems must address – between being too conservative 
(sluggishness or waste) or too aggressive (e.g., over control leading to pilot induce oscillations) 
in adjusting to error or changing situation demands.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In sum, the challenge of safety in sociotechnical system requires us to consider the opportunities 
for improved fit between the structure of organisations, the demands of work ecologies, and the 
technologies for communication and decision making. We suggest that it might be productive to 
frame the question of fit in control theoretic terms in relation to differential demands for 
observability and controllability and the implications for stability.  Observability reflects issues 
of communication to insure that each control component has the information (feedback) needed 
for both local stability with respect to the processes directly under control and global stability 
with respect to coordination with control components at higher and lower levels within the 
sociotechnical system. Controllability reflects issues of decision making that determine whether 
the authority to act is commensurate with the available information and the dynamic demands of 
the work processes (e.g., in terms of time constants and windows of opportunity).  
 This need for a control theoretic approach to safety in sociotechnical systems has been 
previously articulated by Rasmussen and Svedung (2000), and more recently by Leveson (2012). 
However, the need to balance the demands on control and observation have long been 
appreciated by organisational theorists. As March (1991) observed, control (exploitation) and 
observation (exploration) go hand in hand in managing complexity: 
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 A central concern of studies of adaptive processes is the relation between 
the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties … 
Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk 
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation. Exploitation 
includes such things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation, execution. Adaptive systems that engage in exploration to the 
exclusion of exploitation are likely to find that they suffer the costs of 
experimentation without gaining many of its benefits. They exhibit too many 
undeveloped new ideas and too little distinctive competence. Conversely, 
systems that engage in exploitation to the exclusion of exploration are likely to 
find themselves trapped in suboptimal stable equilibria. As a result, 
maintaining an appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation is a 
primary factor in system survival and prosperity (p. 71). 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their very helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this article:  Avinoam Borowsky, Pascale Carayon, Peter 
Hancock, Lawrence Hettinger, William Horrey, Nancy Leveson, Ian Noy, Laerte 
Sznelwar, and Geert van Hottegem. John Flach received support from NSF (IIS-1111182, 
09/01/2011 - 08/31/2014) SoCS program during preparation of this manuscript. 
 
References 
 
56	  	  
Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (1997). In Athena’s Camp. Preparing for conflict  in the 
information age. Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense Research Institute. 
American Industrial Hygiene Association (2012) ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012 Occupational Health 
and Safety Management.  Falls Church, VA:  American Industrial Hygiene Association.    
Brennan TA, Leape LL, Laird N, et al. (1991).  Incidence of adverse events and negligence in 
hospitalized patients: results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. New England 
Journal of Medicine, 324, 370-376. 
Brunswik, E. (1956). Perception and the representative design of psychological experiments. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Convertino, G., Mentis, H.M., Slavkovic, A., Rosson, M.B., and Carroll, J.M. 2011. Supporting 
common ground and awareness in emergency management planning: A design research 
project. ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, 18, 4, article 22. 
Carroll, J.S. and Hatkenaka, S. (2001). Driving organisational change in the midst of crisis, MIT 
Sloan Management Review, 42(3), 70-79. 
Clark, H. H. and Brennan, S. E. (1991). Grounding in communication. In L.B. Resnick, and J.M. 
Levine, J. M., eds.).  Perspectives on socially shared cognition. Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychological Association. 
Clegg, C.W. (2000). Sociotechnical principles for system design. Applied Ergonomics, 31, 463-
477. 
Feynman, R.P. (1999). The Pleasure of Finding Things Out. London: Penguin Books. 
Flach, J.M. (2008). Mind the gap: A skeptical view of macrocognition. In J.M. Schraagen, L.G. 
Militello, T. Ormerod and R. Lipshitz (Eds.). Naturalistic decision making and 
macrocognition. (p. 27–40). Aldershot, England: Ashgate. 
57	  	  
Flach, J.M., Bennett, K.B., Jagacinski, R.J., Mulder, M., van Paassen, M.M. (In press) The 
closed-loop dynamics of cognitive work. In J.D. Lee and A. Kirlik (Eds.). The Oxford 
Handbook of Cognitive Engineering. 
Flach, J.M., Jagacinski, R.J., Smith, M.R.H., and McKenna, B. (2011). Coupling perception, 
action, intention, and value: A control theoretic approach to driving performance. In D.L. 
Fisher, M. Rizzo,  J.K. Caird, and J.D. Lee(Eds.) Handbook of Driving Simulation for 
Engineering, Medicine and Psychology. (p. 43.1 - 43.16). Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and 
Francis, CRC Press. 
Flach, J., Mulder, M., and van Paassen, M.M. (2004). The concept of the ‘situation’ in 
psychology. In S. Banbury and S. Tremblay (Eds.) A cognitive approach to situation 
awareness: Theory, measurement, and application. (pp. 42 – 60). Aldershot, England: 
Ashgate. 
Flach, J.M., Steele-Johnson, D., Shalin, V.L., and Hamilton, G.C. (In press). Coordination and 
control in emergency response. In A. Badiru and L. Racz (Eds.). Handbook of Emergency 
Response: Human Factors and Systems Engineering Approach. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor 
and Francis. 
Hayes-Lundy, C., R.S. Ward, J.R. Saffle, R. Reddy, G.D. Warden, and W.A. Schnebly. (1991). 
Grease burns at fast-food restaurants. Adolescents at risk. J. Burn Care Rehabil., 12(2), 
203–208. 
Hayek, F. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519 
– 530.  
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
58	  	  
Institute of Medicine. (1999). To err is human: Building a safer health care system. Washington, 
DC: National Academies Press. 
Jagacinski, R.J. and Flach, J.M. (2003).  Control Theory for Humans: Quantitative approaches 
to modeling performance.  Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Juarrero, A. (1999). Dynamics in action: Intentional behavior as a complex system. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT  Press.  
Kirlik, A.  (2006). Adaptive perspectives on human-technology interaction: Methods and models 
for cognitive engineering and human-computer interaction. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Leamon, T.B. and P.L. Murphy. (1995). Occupational slips and falls: More than a trivial problem. 
Ergonomics, 38(3), 487–498. 
Leveson, N.G. (2012). Engineering a safer world. Systems thinking applied to safety. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.  
Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety. (2012).  2012 Liberty Mutual workplace safety 
index.  Accessed on July 8, 2013 at:  
http://www.libertymutualgroup.com/omapps/ContentServer?pagename=LMGroup/Views
/LMG&ft=2&fid=1138356633468&ln=en 
Lindblom, (1959).  The science of ‘muddling through,’ Public Administration Review, 19(2), p. 
79 – 88. 
Lindblom, C. (1979). Still muddling, not yet through. Public Administration Review, 39(6), 517 
– 526. 
Mandelbrot, B.B. (1983). The Fractal Geometry of Nature. New York: Freeman. 
March, J. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organisational learning. Organisation Science, 
2(1), 71 – 87. 
59	  	  
Patterson, E.S., Watts-Perotti, J., Woods, D.D. (1999).  Voice loops as coordination aids in space 
shuttle mission control. Computer Supported Cooperative Work: The Journal of 
Collaborative Computing, 8(4), 353-371. 
Perrow, C. (1999). Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
Pew, R. W. and Baron, S. (1978). The components of an information processing theory of skilled 
performance based on an optimal control perspective. In G.E. Stelmach (Ed.). 
Information processing in motor control and learning. (p. 71-78). New York: Academic 
Press.  
Rasmussen, J., Pejtersen, A.M., and Goodstein, L.P. (1994). Cognitive systems engineering. New 
York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Rasmussen, J. and Svedung, I. (2000). Proactive risk management in a dynamic society. 
Stockhold: Swedish Rescue Services Agency. 
Rochlin, G. (1997).  Trapped in the net. The unanticipated consequences of computerization. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rochlin, G., La Porte, T., and Roberts, K. (1987). The self-designing, high-reliability 
organisation. Naval War College Review, 40(4), 76-90. 
Rudolph, J. W., Morrison, J. B., and Carroll, J. S. (2009). The dynamics of action-oriented 
problem solving: Linking interpretation and choice.  Academy of Management Review, 34, 
733-56. 
Sage, A.P. and Cuppan, C.D. (2001). On the systems engineering and management of systems of 
systems and federations of systems. In Information, Knowledge Systems Management 2, 
p. 325-245, IOS Press. 
60	  	  
Shattuck, L. (2000) Communicating intent and imparting presence. Military Review, Mar – Apr, 
66 -72. 
Sheridan, T.B. and Ferrell, W.R. (1974). Man-machine systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Simon, H.A. (1969). The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Sterman, J.D. (2000). Business dynamics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Suchman, L. (1987). Plans and situated actions: The problem of human-machine interaction. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Toffler, A. and Toffler, H. (1997). Forward: The new intangibles. In J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt 
(Eds.) In Athena’s camp: Preparing for conflict in the information age. (p. xiii – xxiv). 
Santa Monica, CA: The Rand National Defense Research Institute.  
Todd, P.M. and Gigerenzer, G. (Eds.) (2012). Ecological rationality: Intelligence in the world. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Verma, S.K., Chang W.R., Courtney, T.K., Lombardi, D.A., Huang, Y.H., Brennan, M.J., 
Mittleman, M.A. and Perry, M.J. (2010). Workers’ experience of slipping in U.S. limited-
service restaurants.  J. Occup Environ Hygiene, 7, 491-500. DOI: 
10.1080/15459624.2010.486693 
Verma, S.K., Chang, W.R, Courtney, T.K., Lombardi, D.A., Huang, Y.H., Brennan, M.J., 
Mittleman, M.A., Ware, J.H., and Perry, M.J. (2011). A prospective study of floor 
surface, shoes, floor cleaning and slipping in US limited-service restaurant workers. 
Occup Environ Med.,  Apr, 68(4), 279-85.  
Vicente, K.J. (1999). Cognitive work analysis: Toward safe, productive, and healthy computer-
based work. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Weick, K.E. (1995). Sensemaking in organisations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
61	  	  
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1.  This figure adapted from Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) illustrates the multiple social 
layers that shape the behavior of sociotechnical systems. Such couplings have important 
implication for the breadth of analysis and for the range of disciplines that must collaborate to 
fully understand these complex systems.  
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Figure 2. This figure adapted from Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) will be used to help illustrate 
the events associated with the struggle to manage safety at the Millstone Power Station. 
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Figure 3. This figure adapted from Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) will be used to help illustrate 
the events associated with the struggle to manage slips and falls in the fast food industry. 
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Figure 4. This figure is intended to illustrate some of the nested loops shaping performance in a 
complex sociotechnical system. Note that all possible loops are not depicted and that each of the 
components may have unique disturbances that influence its output. 
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Figure 5.  These figures are designed to help readers to visualize the general functional relations 
associated with observing and controlling: A) illustrates the observer loop as nested within a 
control loop which is in turn nested within a learning loop; B) illustrates the multi-dimensional 
nature of observation (reflecting the need to integrate multiple sources of information) and 
control (reflecting the need to coordinate multiple degrees of freedom). [See Flach, et al. (2011) 
for similar discussion in the context of driving safety]. 
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Figure 6.  Occupational Health and Safety Management System (OHSMS) Cycle. ANSI/AIHA 
Z10-2012: (AIHA, 2012). 
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Figure 7.  A conceptual space that illustrates some of the important dimensions that will be 
associated with a theoretical approach to sociotechnical systems capable of guiding the design 
of safer systems.  
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